Risto

What of the number that see these lines through?

Perhaps two or she, but doubt fully you.

What's seen is a lie, what's heard are poor jokes.

But bad's in the side, outside your nice hoax.

Admit you're a fool, and eat your own hate.

You know nearly nothing. Such beauty is fate.

Questions at first. Become older not.

Is ignorance real?

In truth we forgot.

Introduction

The domain of science is the natural world. Consequently, an initial estimate of the purpose of scientific theory might be to say that its role is to interpret and describe nature. Science is defined as knowledge of facts and laws, gained and verified by exact observation and organized experiment, while theory is defined as a reasoned set of propositions, developed from and supported by established evidence, and serving as an explanation for natural phenomena; thus, scientific theory substantiates and explains scientific knowledge. Intuitively this description seems clear, but such a summarization requires justification. Are we justified in the production and belief of theories?

A theory is produced by translating experimental observations into linguistic statements and mental abstractions. The question then becomes: can theoretical statements of human ideas act as accurate representations of the natural world? To evaluate the precision of science is to evaluate the products of our physical apparatus, and the problem may be restated thus: how should we regard scientific knowledge?

The investigation of scientific knowledge is the focus of the philosophical debate between realism and anti-realism. Both contend that science aims to provide a literally true story of what the world is like. The realist however states that the proper epistemic attitude towards our scientific theories is that of belief; we should believe that theories are true or approximately true representations of a mind-independent world for all observable and non-observable phenomena. The anti-realist purports that the proper epistemic attitude towards theory is one of acceptance; science does not extend beyond the ordering and correlation of phenomena, and theories cannot be true or even approximately true.

To better understand this difference, consider the scientific theories of Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein. For hundreds of years Newtonian mechanics was accepted as true (or approximately true), only to be shown false and replaced by Einstein's Theory of Relativity. This particular case displays a general characteristic of scientific theory that is relevant to the problem of evaluating science: since the advent of the scientific method, many theoretical explanations and entities have been proposed and later disconfirmed. Accepting the fallibility of science, how can we know that current scientific theories will not be proven false in the future? Why should we believe our current theories are true or even close to the truth? In short, why should we be scientific realists?

This paper will examine why we might plausibly approach science as realists, beginning with a description of the "no miracle argument" (NMA) for realism, followed by a discussion of the "pessimistic meta-induction" (PMI) as an anti-realist response to the NMA. The cogency of the PMI will be examined, and a potential realist solution to the PMI will be presented.

Realism by Default : The No Miracle Argument

The ideas surrounding the NMA were encapsulated in the realist defense of scientific truth presented by Hilary Putnam in 1975: "The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle." In evaluating the truth or truth-likeness of science, the NMA states that the success of science itself demonstrates and confirms the veracity of science and scientific theory. This is an application of inference to the best explanation, where the best explanation for science being successful is that science is true or approximately true.

NMA uses the success of particular theories as premises in a meta-abductive argument regarding science as a whole:

[Proposition 1] Science is the collection of all scientific theories

[Proposition 2] The particular scientific theory, theory 1, is true or approximately true (that is, the particular scientific theory being discussed possesses explanatory ability and enables us to make predictions)

...

[Proposition N] The particular scientific theory, theory N, is true or approximately true

====

[Conclusion] Therefore, all of science is true or approximately true

Arguing from specific cases of success, the NMA makes an inference to the truth of a generalization covering them, and so the NMA promotes a realist justification for scientific truth by approaching the pursuit of science on the whole as an experiment, and appealing to the observable result of that experiment. Hence, the NMA makes an empirical claim about realism; that the observational success of science as an experiment supports the position of the scientific realist.

Again, this position seems intuitively clear, but again: is this argument justified?

An Anti-Realist Response to NMA : The Pessimistic Meta-Induction

The NMA concludes that the success of science may be inferred from the past success of theories, and so the NMA uses an abductive format in an attempt to show that abductive inference is credible. Is an abductive argument that appeals to particular cases of abduction acceptable? Setting aside the question of circularity, a more direct objection can be leveled against the NMA: many past theories have been proven false, so how can we believe that current theories will not be proven wrong in the future, and thus how can we believe that our current scientific knowledge is true or even close to true? Unlike the charge of circularity, this question is a direct response to the NMA in that it is expressed in a format that mirrors the format of the NMA. The NMA is an optimistic meta-abduction on the success of past theories, and the question now asked is a pessimistic meta-induction on the failure of past theories. This pessimistic meta-induction is commonly known as the PMI, and was introduced by Larry Laudan in 1981 as an anti-realist reply to the realist NMA.

The goal of the PMI is to deny that the empirical success of science implies the truth of science. If a past theory provided empirically successful observations then it was described as true. However, if the past theory has been replaced, then the past theory must have been false, and the empirical success of the theory could not have conferred truth onto the theory.

The PMI generalizes the failure of science thus:

[Proposition 1] Science is the collection of all scientific theories

[Proposition 2] The particular scientific theory, theory 1, was held to be true, but was later proven false

...

[Proposition M] The particular scientific theory, theory M, was held to be true, but was later proven false

====

[Conclusion] Therefore, it is not possible to know which scientific theories that are currently held to be true will later be proven false, and it is not possible to believe that all of science is true or approximately true

Arguing from specific cases of failure, the PMI makes an inference to a generalization covering the instances, and advances the anti-realist case against the NMA by showing that the truth of a theory cannot be the best explanation for empirical success, because many theories that were empirically successful are now believed to be false.

The PMI has explicated the fact that it is not possible for the realist to support the claim that every component of science is true or approximately true, but does this provide a decisive refutation of realism?

The Realist Response to the PMI : Blocking Pessimism

The PMI has shown that it is unreasonable to believe that every scientific theory currently held to be true today will not be proven false in the future. What then would it be reasonable for the realist to believe? In building toward its conclusion, the PMI analyzes all of science, and thus all scientific theories. But is it reasonable to give all scientific theories equal weight when evaluating science as a whole?

Some theories are buttressed by a larger amount of support than others, and many theories belong to domains of inquiry that are immature or even suspect. Consider the evidence that exists to support atomic theory, and the number of successful theories in which atomism performs a crucial explanatory function, then contrast the viability of atomic theory with the unsubstantiated theory of water memory as put forth in the field of homeopathy. Both hypotheses claim to be scientific, but it is not logical to regard water memory as equal in worth or stature to atomism, however in examining science the PMI does precisely this, and undue regard is given to objectionable theories.

Still, the PMI may rightly be considered as having shown that it is unreasonable to believe that all of science is true or nearly true. However, in developing this conclusion the PMI has provided the realist with the basis for a counter-argument. Acting on suggestions found within the PMI, the realist response may be built upon a restatement of the PMI. Realism can move forward by replacing the unconditional requirement of absolute truth with the conditional requirement of approximate truth. In other words, realism can succeed if:

i - it does not position itself as an all or nothing proposition

ii - it allows only genuinely scientific theories into the sphere of science

iii - it can demonstrate that previously accepted theories which have proven to be false nonetheless contain true or approximately true elements that were essential to the empirical success of the theory, and that these elements were preserved in later theoretical formations, and thus that these elements provided a reasonable approximation of reality and are true or approximately true

Condition i is a restatement of the PMI; that it is not reasonable to believe that every statement in every scientific theory is true or approximately true. Condition ii states that all theories and disciplines, past or present, should not count equally in the evaluation of science and theory; when determining whether or not to permit a theory into the collection of theories designated as "science," each theory must be assessed individually, taking into consideration factors such as the credibility of the scientist(s) involved and the maturity of the domain of inquiry. Condition iii states that the job of realists is to distinguish the elements of past theories that were necessary in achieving empirical success, and to show that these elements continue to play an indispensable theoretical role.

To illustrate these conditions, let us examine a specific case in which a theory previously held to be true was eventually proven to be false, by considering the replacement of Newtonian mechanics with Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Speaking strictly, the scientific community at large accepts that Newtonian mechanics are false, and that Relativity is the best available approximation at truth. However, many scientists who apply Relativity are working to move beyond it. The scientific community supports attempts to expand and even replace the Theory of Relativity, precisely because Einstein's theory is not regarded as immutable. Thus, condition i is satisfied. Newton's work is widely recognized as one of the greatest scientific achievements of all time, thus condition ii is satisfied. Now, let us consider condition iii. When dealing with the interactions of objects at low speeds (relative to the speed of light) and in conditions of weak gravity, both theories provide acceptable explanations. However, Newtonian mechanics is confirmable only until we encounter instances in which the curvature of space-time becomes so large that this explanation fails. Here we find that Einstein's explanation remains confirmable in every instance. How did Relativity come to subsume Newtonian mechanics? Einstein developed Relativity by combining successful elements from Newtonian mechanics, such as the gravitational constant, with successful elements from other theories, and was thus able to construct an inference about nature that was more extensive than Newton's. When integrating predicates from several scientific models, Einstein's theory eliminated unstable elements, and preserved the key features of the original models that were accurate representations of nature. Hence, condition iii is satisfied.

Conclusion

How should we regard science? The anti-realist observes that many past theories have been acknowledged as acceptable explanations of reality and later disconfirmed, and argues that because there is no procedure for determining which theories will be proven false in the future it cannot be reasonable to believe that science is true or almost true. When faced with the fallibility of scientific theories, why should we be scientific realists?

In considering a scientific theory that has been proven false, the job of the realist is to demonstrate that though the theory was discredited it did in fact contain true or approximately true elements, and the theoretical elements and generalizations that contributed to the empirical success of the theory were preserved in consequential theories. Consequential theories provide a mechanism for refining earlier theories, enabling the scientist to filter out inconsequential elements. The theoretical elements and generalizations that did not contribute to the empirical success of a theory will be omitted from later theories, thus improving the overall truth or approximate truth of science as a whole. Acting on this recognition, the scientific realist can block the PMI.

Are there not rules we must obey?

But, if there are rules, are they by reality, or your experience of it?

Because of our left brain, or your right?

How is it most curious!

But, if it is most curious, then is it feebly random, or a healthy gestalt?

Are there not rules?

Introduction

By the turn of the twentieth century, China had a history of dynastic rule stretching over 3,000 years. Throughout the centuries, rebellions had tested and toppled rulers, and thus the fact that the ruling dynasty was in decline was not something entirely new. However when this monarch fell, monarchy itself fell with them. Political alternatives emerged, and within a few decades China became a communist republic. What led to these dramatic changes? Why did early Chinese communists feel communism was an appropriate ideology for China?

Official Communist history claims a long tradition of quasi-communistic Chinese thought, and suggests this tradition eased and even made inevitable the success of Communism. This paper however will argue that the conditions enabling the rise of political alternatives, let alone communism, arrived with the fall of the Qing Dynasty.

Socialist philosophy began gaining ground in the late 1800's, and respect proliferated for Marxism-Leninism after the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Reform-minded intellectuals aligned with the proletariat, and found an idealistic model for change in the Russian Revolution of 1917. Like the Bolsheviki, early Chinese communists decried imperialism and class struggle; and like the conditions the Bolshevik revolted against, China possessed a large peasant population, who had been living in a semi-feudal and agrarian economy under an autocracy. The Bolsheviki emerged victorious atop communism, and hence communist teaching was seen as visionary theory, while the Bolshevik revolution was admired as successful action.

It was for these reasons that early Chinese communists felt communism was an appropriate ideology for China: absolutism waned; industrial growth and liberalization united reformists against imperialism and conservatism; Russian communists had made practical advancements; pre-communist Russia was similar to China; and communist theory promised to fulfill revolutionary aspirations -- technological advancement in a classless society founded on freedom and justice -- a Chinese version of communism that provided the benefits of modernization but none of the problems of Westernization.

This paper will trace the trajectory of China during the early twentieth-century, and outline the five key factors that gave rise to Chinese communism: dynastic decline, industrialization, liberal radicalization, nationalism, and Russian Communism.

Dynastic Decline: The Foundation of Sociopolitical Rebirth

On the most basic level, the ascent of communism was made possible by the decline of monarchism. The fall of dynasty corresponded to the dissolution of ideological conformity, and this permitted new forms of social thought and political activity.

Prior to the twentieth century, uprisings and incursions had challenged the monarch, but even when the monarch was not Chinese, monarchy itself remained. "[C]hange of dynasty was not a revolution; it was a change of government." By the twentieth century this pattern no longer held true; dynasty faced not replacement, but collapse. During the mid-nineteenth century the Qing launched an operation of national reform, in an attempt to stabilize power. The campaign proved ineffective, and in 1898 the emperor began reforming the Dynasty into a constitutional monarchy. Over the course of the next decade the Manchu Reform Movement made sweeping changes to the empire.

As regards the development of communism, four reforms were particularly salient: i) the abolition of civil service examinations, which broke the ties that bound the intelligentsia to civil service, and thus to the ruler; ii) the move towards parliamentary government, which weakened the power of the monarch over the people and the hold of absolutism over thought; iii) the establishment of a national banking system, which empowered decentralized capitalization and industrialization; and iv) the establishment of a national schooling system, which soon produced a censorious liberal intelligentsia.

Reforms did little for the empire, and in 1911 the Qing were forced to cede power to former military general Yuan Shikai. Shikai declared himself emperor in 1914 but died in 1916, at which time warlords began to vie for the control of government.

Warlord governments remained preoccupied with civil war, and were frequently overturned. Central governance deteriorated, and local businessmen took an active role in municipal affairs. Industrialists gained political power, and in this environment two key elements of communist philosophy were reified: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Industrialization: Emergence of the Bourgeoisie and Proletariat

Industrialization began in 1862 and advanced moderately in the following decades. Though industry was influenced by Western ideas and employed Western bureaucrats, it remained under Chinese control. This changed in 1895, when Japan emerged victorious from the Sino-Japanese war and won the right to open factories in China. Western powers followed suit, and developed private economies in treaty ports.

Economic growth was hampered by imperialism and unequal treaties, and it was not until World War One that China began to regain control of industrialization. Great Powers became occupied with war in Europe, Western dominance in China abated, and Chinese exports and production increased. Chinese industry grew rapidly, and brought forth a "Golden Age." Growth was bolstered by national banking and powerful businessmen, and China saw "landmarks in the development of modern ... money and credit ... [and] a tendency toward capital concentration." The concentration of capital amplified social stratification, and class antagonism became a tangible social condition. Nominal wages and maximal working hours defined industrial working life. These developments were pivotal in the evolution of Chinese communism, and Marxist analysis easily explained the interplay of industry and labour; "The emergence and development of national capitalism in China implied the emergence and development of the bourgeoisie and proletariat ... new-born classes which have never existed before in Chinese history."

The proletariat were not alone in their contraposition to exploitation. Soon, they would be united with another of China's modern developments: the radical intelligentsia.

Liberalization and Radicalization: The Origins of Communistic Thought

Intellectual life was dramatically altered during the early 1900's. Reforms established a national school system in 1901, and liberal ideas spread quickly through popular translations of Western books. Intellectuals reflected on modern ideas in politics, science, and the arts, and in this environment a new type of intellectual emerged: born in traditional circumstances but educated in reformist conditions. Repulsed by the old order, aroused by liberalism, and contemptuous of capitalization, these intellectuals soon became the first proponents of communism in China.

Prior to Manchu reforms, intellectual service meant civil service, and civil service meant service to the ruler. Civil work unified the intelligentsia and the empire; however when reforms abolished civil service examinations the integration of "intellectual life and political life ... was broken." Intellectuals worked outside of government, and soon scrutinized the very concept of government itself. Against a backdrop of government instability and social strife, socialist philosophy flourished. Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, an educator with anarchist sympathies, installed liberal reformists into Peking University, which soon became a forum for debates between "traditional literati and modern intellectuals." Most prominent among those who contributed to communism were Hu Shih, Ch'en Duxiu and Li Dazhao. All three disparaged of the old Confucian order and big business, and believed education and youth could regenerate China along humanistic lines.

Shih advocated "new literature"; a move from the traditional wenyen writing style to paihua -- the vernacular -- in order to make written works accessible to the masses. The transition away from classical writing would undermine the basis of traditional elitism, and this tactic was echoed in the "mass line" strategy of future communists.

Duxiu established the magazine "New Youth", which promoted democratic and scientific ideas. He greatly feared what Marshall McLuhan later called "hardening of the categories;" the attenuation of active thought, and the passive acceptance of conservative ideology. Duxiu reasoned that "[o]ut of ten young men ... nine are old in ... mentality," and attacked old order traditions while promoting new world thought.

Dazhao was head librarian at Peking, and helped found the magazine "Weekly Critic" in 1918. While New Youth encouraged cultural change, the Critic endorsed political change. Dazhao "abhorred the past and the 'dry skeleton' of Confucianism," and believed youthful energy should be channeled toward political revolution.

New thought and new literature produced the aggressively reformist New Culture Movement. Socialism motivated the campaign, whose central themes were freedom and progress. The oppressive cultural patterns of conservatism were attacked, and Confucian principles were denounced under the rallying call "Decry Filial Piety!" Duxiu summarized the movement in rationalistic directives: "Be men of progress, not bound by routine; Be internationalist, not isolationist; Be scientific, not imaginative."

During this period thousands of students received a Western education studying abroad, and millions more received a Western-style education while studying at home in China. Students became optimistic revolutionaries, and sought to redefine themselves -- to find a new culture to regenerate China, and a new identity to redefine the Chinese.

That new identity began to take shape in 1919, when a spontaneous student protest unified disparate elements that had previously struggled in isolation.

Nationalism: The May Fourth Movement

The May Fourth Movement was a watershed in Chinese history. Patriotism had never been an active concept in Chinese thought; there had never been a significant contrast between nations and states, because submission to the ruler was the only option. Patriotism emerged as a response to imperialism, and nationalism stirred in 1915 when Japan imposed their infamous Twenty-One demands. So it was that popular protest broke out on the fourth of May, 1919, when the announcement was made that Japan won control of the Chinese province of Shandong, under the Treaty of Versailles.

Chinese delegates had been shut out of the conference at Versailles, as Western Powers took it upon themselves to distribute Chinese lands. Reformist students were outraged, and staged demonstrations in Beijing. Protest spread across the country as students won support from merchants, workers, the press, and warlords. The police in Beijing made arrests but soon discovered that protesters outnumbered jail cells, and opted to lock students in the University. The irony of imprisoning intellectuals in the very buildings that were the fountainhead of their ideas was not lost on Ch'en Kung-po, who later recalled the scene with defiant nostalgia; "What a terrible and wonderful scene it was!" Protesters demanded the dismissal of ministers involved in the debacle, and fearing that demonstrations might grow into a revolutionary coup, the ministers were dismissed, the students were freed, and the Treaty of Versailles was not signed.

Protesters were empowered by this victory and recognized the possibility for change. Soon, what began as May fourth demonstrations became an entire May Fourth Movement, embodying New Culture, anti-warlordism, anti-imperialism, and anti-capitalism. Writ large, the movement promoted patriotism, science, democracy, and freedom; while condemning imperialism, autocracy, patriarchy, and blind adherence to tradition. Though students and intellectuals drove the demonstrations, the movement unified the intelligentsia and the proletariat. Shanghai workers went on strike in support of the movement, and this had a profound impact on reformists. Previously, radical intellectuals had claimed revolution for themselves, however they now saw the plight and strength of workers, and expanded their revolutionary ideas to include workers in solidarity. "Consciousness of class within China had given socialism a new urgency."

Socialism thrived. Intellectuals promulgated pacifism, utopianism, anarchism, and many other ideas; however, even though discussion was abundant, progress was not. Communal living experiments faltered, and dense theory was not relevant in the minds of the masses. One theory however offered not just analysis, but action: Marxism-Leninism. Soon, where there was once an unsystematic swarm of competing socialisms, one ideology organized with force: communism.

Out of Many, One: Russian Influence and the Birth of the CCP

Study groups formed across the country, as intellectuals sought to unpack the issues circumscribed by the May Fourth Movement. Bolshevism motivated some groups to focus on Marxism-Leninism, and when agents of the Communist International (Comintern) arrived they discovered it was a short step from study group to political cell.

In 1920, Li Dazhao and Ch'en Duxiu organized Marxist study groups in Beijing and Shanghai respectively, and in 1921 the Comintern sent agents to develop communism. With some groups having already begun to focus on Marxism, Chinese radicals proved an eager audience for agent Grigori Voitinsky. Nevertheless, though radicals agreed on socialism, they did not agree on much else. This contention proved useful to Voitinsky, and he consolidated variant socialist analyses in a communist framework. Comintern agents fixated on similarities between China and Russia, and Voitinsky "portrayed the [October] revolution as one that had overthrown ... foreigners ... 'bankers, warlords, and bureaucrats' " -- ergo, precisely the revolution Chinese socialists desired. China's Marxist-Leninists "could reach but one conclusion: 'follow the Russian way.' " One of the CCP's founding members later explained: "Dissatisfied with the results of the revolution, and believing its effects insufficient to get rid of the oppression, the Chinese decided that another step should be taken -- communism should be tried."

The Comintern soon suggested the creation of an official Communist party. Study groups that had focused on Marxism-Leninism broke from other socialistic groups and emphasized the priority of class struggle. These groups commuted into political cells, and directed the activities of other study groups as they converted to communism.

Radical thought had created a foundation for communist thought, and socialist study groups provided an organizational basis for the communist party.

Conclusion

Chinese communism began with the deterioration of Chinese dynasty. A weak dynasty gave way to warlordism and instability, and while government declined, industrialization increased. China's agricultural economy was transformed, and an urban working class emerged. Nationalism solidified in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles, and May Fourth demonstrations empowered new radicals and the new working class.

Though revolutionaries were stimulated by the democratic ideas and scientific progress of the West, respect for the West was tempered by repulsion for Western imperiousness. The success of the Russian Revolution and arrival of the Comintern prompted formation of the CCP, however this was possible only because old order absolutism had lost its hold; the emperor, Confucius, and agriculture no longer governed China. By 1921, imperialism and class conflict were not merely theoretical concepts, they were social constructs, and with guidance from the Comintern, Chinese radicals came to believe communism was the appropriate ideology for China because it offered an organized sino-socialist program that was relevant to Chinese conditions. "Which socialism?" was the question; "Communism" was the answer.

Accepting that elitist and inegalitarian political hypotheses are facile, preposterous, and juvenile, then the goal of life is not just happiness, but the more inclusive ideal of the "greatest amount of happiness altogether." The greatest amount of happiness altogether differs from conventional happiness (say, for example, pragmatically oriented life directives such as "do what makes you happy") in two important ways: 1) we must critically examine the things that make us happy, and 2) while critically examining our happiness we must recognize and accept that our happiness is bound to the happiness of others, and hence, we must assign great value to the happiness of others. This implies the development and maintenance of an environment that provides a sustainable and enduring quality of life for every person. If we are to live according to this goal, then one significant precondition for living a valuable life is promoting the greatest liberty for the greatest number.

If we accept the statements above, then we must define liberty. A relevant definition of liberty is the "power or right of doing, thinking, speaking, etc., according to choice." So, in order to possess liberty, all people must be permitted to control and develop their lives "according to choice." Working from this definition, we can say the task of promoting liberty must be concerned with enabling all people to make their own decisions, and empowering all people to maintain control over their own lives. This requires that all people must be given access to the information they believe is relevant to controlling their lives. All people must be afforded education, whether this means learning how to mend a button, or how to mend an artery. In summary then: the task of effecting happiness entails the promotion of liberty, and the task of promoting liberty entails the provision of education.

A paradox of modern life now becomes apparent: liberty has been an active concept for millenia (and so lack of exposure to the concept can not be the problem), education is a prerequisite for liberty, and education is available in the modern world ad nauseam; however, the promulgation of education has not resulted in the promulgation of liberty, and has certainly not achieved the greatest liberty for the greatest number. In order to verify this last statement, let us consider an example which definitively supports the argument that the greatest liberty for the greatest number has not been achieved: starvation.

The condition of starvation completely negates liberty. It is inescapably true that a person's "power or right of doing, thinking, [and] speaking ... according to choice" is abrogated by starvation. Even history's most terrible monsters do not deny that "hunger shatters all plans." The reality of starvation is that "963 million people across the world are hungry," and that "[e]very day, almost 16,000 children die from hunger-related causes." If we genuinely believe that the goal of life is the greatest amount of happiness altogether, then the statistics of modern starvation on their own are enough to show that we are nowhere near achieving such a goal.

What are the barriers to ending starvation? Are we limited by technology? No. (This response needs no intensive proof.) Are we limited by resources? While over-population is a valid theoretical concern, the combination of modern agricultural methods with the grossly unequal distribution of resources does not permit even minimal confidence in the claim that starvation persists primarily because of resource limitations. Until humanity at large has actually undertaken the project of ending starvation, it is impossible to demonstrate that there are more people than resources. In lieu of undertaking this project, an easy way to justify the claim that starvation is aggravated by limited resources is to assert that the lives of some people are more valuable than the lives of others (though not necessarily using that language), and that for some reason there are people who deserve more resources than others, whatever that reason may be: effort, intelligence, lineage, etc. However, recall the opening sentence of this essay, in which we accepted the claim "that elitist ... political hypotheses are facile, preposterous, and juvenile." In this case, no method exists for justifying the opulent lifestyles and unnecessary wastefulness of first world citizens as somehow valid in the face of the starvation of third world citizens. If the barrier to ending starvation can not be resources, then what can it be?

If education is a prerequisite for liberty and exists in the modern world ad nauseam, then how is it that after centuries of globalization, and in the midst of so much education, there remains a colossal dearth of liberty on the global scale, as displayed for example by the problem of starvation? If it is true that education and liberty are positively correlated, then should we not expect that increased education would coincide with increased liberty? Should we not expect that with ever-increasing interrelations between all nations of the world, that fundamental problems such as starvation should have been eradicated throughout the entire planet? Instead, even in the midst of epidemic starvation in third world nations, business systems and material progress in post-modern first world nations have produced their own peculiar epidemic. "[A]n epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity -- the epidemic of over-production," and the perhaps even more absurd "solution" of planned obsolescence. Clearly, based on the uneven distribution of resources that persists in the face of mass suffering, we see that any expectation regarding the positive correlation of liberty with education can only be deemed reasonable relative to some systems of reasoning, but not all.

So: happiness requires liberty and liberty requires education, but the propagation of education has not produced the greatest liberty for the greatest number. Something is missing. Is the missing element something other than education, or does our notion of education require refinement? An obvious question that presents itself is the nature of education: what is the purpose of education, if not to develop the greatest liberty for the greatest number? A part of the answer is that liberty is a moral concept of political philosophy (although the study of political philosophy is of course not the sole route to the development of similar conceptions), and as such, the definition of liberty as the individual "power or right of doing, thinking, speaking, etc., according to choice" is not inextricably bound to the process of education. To see this, consider military education. "The challenge for the Marine Corps is finding the balance between abusive methods and the need to train an elite fighting force disciplined to fight and die on command." Precisely because dying on command is a command, a person following such a command does not possess the "power ... of doing ... according to choice," and thus that person can not be said to possess liberty in any important sense of the word. It is true that a person may willfully choose to follow the command to enter mortal combat, but that does not terminate this debate -- what developed in the person a system of reasoning that led them to make the one choice that denies them the possibility of making any other choice ever again (and in all likelihood involves imposing the same abrogation of liberty on others involved in the same mortal combat)? "Nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or, unless his memory be hurt by disease or ill constitution of organs, excellently foolish."

The complexity of the problem is now apparent. While starvation is an obvious abrogation of liberty, teaching a person to willingly follow the command to enter mortal combat is a more subtle abrogation of liberty. Given current levels of technology and knowledge, the only possible method for justifying either of these abrogations of liberty is through the application of elitist political hypotheses. From this we may conclude that education on its own does not entail the investigation or development of an ethical system that encourages the greatest liberty for the greatest number. If education did aspire to the greatest amount of happiness altogether, then education would not simply be "the act or process of imparting or acquiring particular knowledge or skills," but would instead continuously adapt itself toward the goal of effecting the greatest amount of happiness altogether, and thus toward the purpose of solving humanity's most pressing problems as regards liberty. The list of humanity's most pressing problems as regards liberty would be dynamic, but in any case, the problem of eradicating starvation would weigh heavily on the mind of every student, as would the problem of eradicating social environments that can find justification for training people to die on command.

If we can agree that the existence of starvation is appalling, while at the same time agreeing that both the resources and technology exist to mitigate it, then the question remains: why does starvation persist in the midst of plenty? What about other impediments to liberty? What is it that prevents realization of the greatest liberty for the greatest number? These questions are not entirely insoluble, and many of the answers lie inside of our social institutions.

The next blog in this series will build on the discussion of liberty from this article, and move on to discuss the danger of institutional normalization from a more general perspective.