Risto

Common sense -- that is to say, comprehension and proficiency in many of the life lessons that are not assigned grades or designations -- does not imply academic sense, nor is the inverse implicate. A successful social figure may be profoundly illogical, while an academic genius may be a villain in any social context. Excluding physical impediments to mental ability, common sense and intelligence are consequences of experience, but it is of course not inexorable that equivalent experience will produce equivalent sense and intelligence. Barring malady, we may say that when considering the average person, the more experience they have in a particular field of study, the greater their depth of knowledge in that field becomes. With the aforementioned in mind, it is important to recognize that in all cases a person's ability to make sound judgments must be approached with respectful skepticism and examined critically, whether or not the realm of discussion being considered lies within their experience and education.

A problem often left unexamined by "professionals" is that of hyperdisciplinarity; the condition by which a highly educated person perceives and interprets all experiences through the prism of their specific education, often accompanied by a process in which self-certitude extends beyond the realm of actual understanding and ability. Humans reflexively approach life using those abilities they have most focused on or developed, and thus continue to enhance those abilities to the detriment of others; "The professional ... tends to define his problems on the basis of the technique that he has mastered, and has a natural desire to apply his skills." Here "human nature works against us ... [because] most of us embrace our first answer so strongly that we read less critically than we should. We easily spot data and arguments that confirm our claim, but we just as easily overlook or distort data that qualify or even contradict it. We don't do that deliberately; it's just human nature. You have to guard against this bias, not only in your own work but in your sources, especially when they agree with you." At a somewhat more conscious level, people "quite naturally define as the most important and admired qualities for a citizen those on which they themselves have concentrated." The important point here is that "[t]hose who are expert are so on only a few topics"; and, combining this point with the preceding observations, we observe that as a consequence of the phenomenon in question, people readily display over confidence when making inferences and drawing conclusions in domains of knowledge that they have not penetrated at even a surface level.

Over time, by way of hyperdisciplinarity and poor humility, and whether education is narrowly limited or not, one may become increasingly assured of the correctness of all of their decisions and critical standpoints, and begin to believe they have constructed a mental map of reality that approximates the natural world as superlatively as possible. By such a map, certitude may extend beyond the realm of one's experience, creeping into fields in which a person's knowledge has not progressed. Furthermore, with a lack of exposure, or through a lack of use, information and ideas may decline even to the point of regression, and it is possible that which had been learned may become unlearned. As age increases, creeping certitude and regressive comprehension complicate the task of even basic education, as arrogance is mistaken for competence, and a person's low self-esteem creates a feedback loop with their stubbornness, thus debasing one's ability for introspection, and effecting an emotional barrier against intellectual growth. New or contrasting frameworks of thought, let alone specific new ideas, are decreasingly permitted through the doors of consideration.

This problem exists acutely in those that subscribe to a faith based ethos, and to a lesser extent in those subscribing to an analytical ethos. Those who approach epistemology from a critical perspective possess the ability to apply reason to any belief, improving their understanding by engaging the universe through the iterative process of observation, hypothesis, experiment, and conclusion. In this way, the scientific method is a process for learning that is apposite to all empirical knowledge and belief, and is not limited to technological advancement. ( As some might suggest.) Because faith based beliefs about the real world are empirical beliefs, they are no different in origin or quality than other real world empirical beliefs; and regardless of context all manners of empirical belief remain uniform in their nature. Faith based beliefs therefore occupy the same elemental category as all other empirical beliefs, and do not possess a category peculiar to themselves. Accordingly, the veracity of a faith based belief must be confirmed using the same truth test that is applied to any other empirical belief: the scientific method.

If you question the idea that faith must be examined with a scientific approach, reflect honestly on your own daily conduct; how is it that you have come to approach routine tasks as you do? Why do you believe that you must eat food? Why do you believe that the sun will rise tomorrow? Is it for the same reasons that you believe 2 + 2 = 4? Taking a step back; what approach do you take to learning in general? Do you apply a process of observation and experimentation? Or do you eschew the external world and make all decisions based on internal presuppositions?

Too-easy-faith runs the risk of working backwards from the desired conclusion, conceiving of supportive explanations that are themselves unsupported, and indeed, unsupportable. Analysis performed using such a faith based framework may thusly lend itself to circulus in demonstrando, which is the diametric opposition of human logic and reasoning. Such a framework teaches what to think, where science teaches how to think. Faith thereby proves itself inane and fantastic precisely because it is difficult to impart the faithful with the tools to move beyond the comfortable, accommodating, and effortless position of self-certifying conviction, and towards a knowledge based objectivism. Such gains require a mentalist monist version of Bittul Hayesh and the willingness to admit that supernaturalism, for example, is nothing more than an abstract conception particular to human consciousness, not a physical reality such as a brain cell.

In its quest to prove its own infallibility, faith eliminates one of nature's truly superior achievements that is manifest in humanity: the ability to recognize and address fallacy. Here the perception of Martin Luther was clear: "Whoever wants to be a Christian should tear the eyes out of his reason."

No animal possesses the facility of self-correction to a degree nearly as developed as that of mankind, and reasoning systems that rely on faith or unsubstantiated argumentation purge us of this facility. In this way, faith reduces our ability to discern and dispose of fallacy, thus pushing us down a notch on the evolutionary scale, edging backwards intellectually and regressing us towards the capability of Hylobatidae.

"To the extent that we can put our prejudgments aside, we will increase the usefulness of our observations ... No matter how expertly we observe, we can never have studied all of a situation. In addition, our observations inevitably reflect individual idiosyncrasies. For these reasons, we hold our conclusions tentatively and seek information about what others have observed. Where we find convergence of results we can feel more secure, although still not certain, in our inferences." "Since human beings are prone to err, we are open to the modification of all principles ... the scientific method, though imperfect, is still the most reliable way of understanding the world."